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5 
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND GERMAN CRIMINAL LAW 
RESPONSIBILITY OF MANAGERS FOR  
HIGHLY-SPECULATIVE TRADING WITH  
OBSCURE ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES  
BASED ON AMERICAN SUBPRIME MORTGAGES* 
VOLKER KREY 
– with assistance by Jan Stenger and Oliver Windgätter – ** 
Part One: Call for Criminal Prosecution in Public; in Contrast 
to this the Public Prosecution’s Hesitation to Prosecute 
Speedy and Publicly 
I. Call for Criminal Prosecution in Public 
“Should bankers be publicly hanged for what they have done?” 
During a visit to Abu Dhabi in March 2009, the author came upon 
this sarcastic question while reading the well known United Arab 
Emirates’ journal “The National”: The aforesaid question was part 
of an interview with Paul Koster, chief executive of the Dubai Fi-
nancial Services Authority, concerning the financial crisis1. Self-
                                      
*  Manuscript of a lecture presented by the author in October 2009 at The Univer-
sity of Hongkong, Faculty of Law. The manuscript has been extended, amended 
and completed by some footnotes. 
**  Jan Stenger, studying law at the State University of Trier, Faculty of Law, is 
member of the staff of the author’s chair. Oliver Windgätter, senior researcher 
and assistant lecturer, is member of the staff of Prof. Dr. Gerhard Robbers’ 
chair, University of Trier. 
–  Regarding the translation into English, the author was additionally supported by 
Kerstin Labs and attorney at law Thomas Roggenfelder, both being members of 
the author’s chair as well. Last but not least, the author got helpful advices from 
his colleague Prof. Dr. Jan von Hein (Trier). – 
1  See: The National, dated 26 March 2009, page 3. 
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evidently, he answered in the negative by saying: “There will be 
court cases, but public hanging is a bit extreme.” His statement 
has, in a way, anticipated the result of the paper at hand: There 
should be criminal proceedings in Germany as well; however, they 
should not result in draconian criminal consequences. 
Already in January 2009, during the World Economic Forum in 
Davos, Switzerland, the British manager John Neill called for se-
vere punishment2: The producers of toxic securities should be 
treated like other preparers of poison; they should be sent to 
prison, if necessary. The State has to clarify that such conduct 
causes criminal responsibility. Self-evidently, John Neill’s state-
ment does not only hold for producing toxic securities, but all the 
more for trading with such financial products. More precisely: 
Gambling away billions of Euros of a bank’s money by buying 
dubious asset-backed securities based on American subprime 
mortgages without sufficient information on their structure and 
value3, even more causes criminal responsibility. This is because 
such highly speculative investments may result in the endanger-
ment or even destruction of the bank in question’s economic ba-
sis. 
Moreover, Christian Wulff, Prime Minister of the German State of 
Lower-Saxony, in March 2009 demanded to take a hard line on 
those managers, responsible for the financial crisis4: “Blowing a 
bank’s money contrary to managers’ duties is a criminal offence.” 
In the author’s view, this holds at least in case of threatening the 
bank’s financial existence. 
Furthermore, Erich Samson, full professor of criminal law (Buce-
rius Law School, city of Hamburg), has stated in 20095: “Georg 
Funke [former Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of the German Bank 
Hypo Real Estate] actually should have to face pre-trial custody at 
anytime”, since this bank would evidently have become insolvent 
due to highly speculative derivative-activities with Lehman-Broth-
                                      
2  Die Welt (i.e. a German daily newspaper), dated 30 January 2009, page 3. 
3  As to this decisive aspect (lack of sufficient information) see below: Part Three, 
II 1, III Firstly, Fourthly. 
4  Die Welt (see footnote 2), dated 03 March 2009. 
5  Cited by Gerhard Strate (see footnote 7). 
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ers etc. unless the German federal authorities would not have 
granted a huge bail-out6. 
Finally, referring to this statement, the German defense counsel 
Gerhard Strate informed his colleagues during the 60th Meeting of 
the German Attorneys at Law in May 2009 that he had filed a re-
quest for prosecution against the CEO of the HSH Nordbank (a 
bank owned by the State of Hamburg and the State of Schleswig-
Holstein)7. To give reasons for his request, Gerhard Strate re-
ferred to the nearly unbelievable amount of damage, caused by 
irresponsible gambling at the securities market – lots of billions 
of Euros. 
Such statements correspond with the predominating public opinion 
in Germany. People are seriously scandalized and expect criminal 
proceedings against the responsible bankers as a demand of jus-
tice, particularly since the taxpayers have to bear the costs of 
numerous and large financial bail-outs by the German Federation 
and/or the German States. From the author’s point of view, the 
people’s legal loyalty would be severely affected if there were no 
criminal proceedings against such bankers. Criminal proceedings 
and criminal convictions inter alia have the purpose to demon-
strate the inviolability of the legal system and thus reinforce the 
people’s confidence in the law8, not to mention the deterrent effect 
of prosecuting criminal offences9. 
                                      
6  Thereto more precisely below, Part Two, I. 
7  Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (i.e. a German daily newspaper), dated 27 May 
2009, page 21. 
8  Concerning such purposes of punishment see: Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht All-
gemeiner Teil, Lehrbuch in Deutsch und Englisch, Teil I: Grundlagen – Ger-
man Criminal Law General Part, Textbook in German and English, Volume I: 
Basics, 2002, sidenotes 118, 129, 134-140, 142-144, 146. 
9  As to deterrence as purpose of punishment see Krey (footnote 8), sidenotes 127, 
128, 144, 146. 
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II.  In Contrast: Actually No Criminal Proceedings by the 
German Public Prosecution Authorities Being Notified 
Publicly 
In spectacular cases of economic crime, the German public prose-
cution authorities occasionally start criminal proceedings fast, 
sometimes even in a demonstrative manner e.g. by way of 
searches and seizures respectively by arresting prominent ac-
cused persons. 
Case example: The German top manager Wolfgang Zumwinkel, 
at that time CEO of the German postal service, was one of the in-
numerable accused in the so called Liechtenstein-Affair, concern-
ing tax fraud. The prosecution authorities arrested him in a de-
monstrative manner accompanied by television transmission10. In 
this case, the amount of loss to the disadvantage of the state’s 
treasury was only a little more than one million Euro – “peanuts” 
compared with the damage caused by such bank managers in-
volved in trading with toxic securities like Lehman-Brothers-
Papers, because in the latter cases typically lots of billions of Eu-
ros loss are in question. 
Regarding the financial crisis, the public has until now actually not 
been notified of criminal proceedings against bank managers by 
the German public prosecution authorities. In the light of the 
aforesaid unbelievable amount of damage, caused by managers 
who gambled away the banks’ money, the mentioned lack of (pub-
licly notified) criminal proceedings prima facie is a mystery. How-
ever, the author assumes that the following reasons may be deci-
sive for such hesitation of the public prosecutors in charge – even 
though, insofar, they probably act in an unconscious manner. 
Firstly, according to its personal and material resources, the pub-
lic prosecution is absolutely unable to carry out criminal procedure 
investigations against every suspect banker. Even if the public 
prosecution’s authorities were willing to restrict their prosecution 
                                      
10  Arresting the accused in this way, was rightly criticized by the trial court in the 
criminal proceedings against Wolfgang Zumwinkel, see: http://www.fazfinance. 
net/Aktuell/Steuern-und-Recht/Zwei-Jahre-Bewaehrungsstrafe-fuer-Zumwinkel 
-4498.html. 
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activities at first to the prime suspect bank managers, in the long 
run the aforesaid resources could become seriously overloaded as 
well. 
Secondly, fighting the financial crisis, limiting the damage to the 
banks concerned and rescuing their economic existence, a coop-
eration with criminal bankers involved may typically be necessary 
for the affected banks due to such managers’ experience and 
knowledge of the obscure asset-backed securities in question. 
Thirdly, to put it bluntly, in political circles the following view 
seems to predominate: Comprehensive and rigorous criminal pro-
ceedings against the suspect bank managers could unsettle the 
banking industry seriously. Moreover, such approach to the re-
sponsible managers could cause “acts of defiance”, which would 
possibly endanger the handling of the financial crisis. Here, obvi-
ously a self-perception of the bankers concerned is presumed 
to be characterized not by sorrow but by the arrogant attitude: “We 
hold systemic-relevance and thus de facto immunity.” 
Fourthly, if the public prosecution started proceedings against re-
sponsible bankers being members of the boards of managing di-
rectors (Vorstand), consequently, there would have to be criminal 
investigations against suspect members of the respective supervi-
sory boards (Aufsichtsrat/Verwaltungsrat) as well. Unfortunately, 
members of the latter boards typically are inter alia politicians up 
to State ministers and – due to the German system of worker par-
ticipation – trade union officials. In principle, there might not be a 
real political approval for criminal proceedings against such per-
sons... 
In fact, according to the author’s information, the German public 
prosecution authorities typically recur on a lack of criminal intent 
and thus set aside criminal proceedings against bank managers, 
being suspected of highly speculative purchase of toxic deriva-
tives. However, this approach is not convincing, which shall be 
discussed below11. 
                                      
11  See below, Part Three, II 4, III Fourthly. 
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Part Two: The Financial Crisis  
– Economic Background and Damage – 
I. German Banks’ Amount of Loss 
–  The above mentioned German bank Hypo Real Estate12 has 
suffered more than one hundred Billion Euros loss caused 
by managers gambling away the bank’s money. Due to its 
systemic-relevance, the German Federation has de facto na-
tionalized the Hypo Real Estate by stock purchase in order to 
rescue Hypo Real Estate from insolvency. 
–  Landesbanken, i.e. banks of German States like Bavaria, 
North Rhine-Westphalia13 etc., furthermore the aforesaid 
HSH Nordbank have each suffered lots of billions of Euros 
loss which would have resulted in their insolvency if the Ger-
man Federal and State authorities had not rescued such 
banks by investing taxpayers’ money. 
–  Even the Dresdner Bank, formerly number two in Germany, 
suffered lots of billions of Euros loss by trading with dubious 
asset-backed-securities. In the meantime it has been taken 
over by the Commerzbank nearly resulting in the latter bank’s 
insolvency because of the financial risks in the business re-
cords of the Dresdner Bank: The German Federation had to 
help out the Commerzbank with 10 billion Euros. 
All in all, the German Federal financial supervisory authority 
(BaFin) has put the German banks’ risks caused by toxic securi-
ties and credits in the context of the financial crisis to an amount of 
800 billion Euros14. However, this alarming estimation, content of 
a secret dossier, was meanwhile played down by politicians and 
bankers. 
                                      
12  See above Part One, I (in the context of footnote 5). 
13  See Marcus Lutter, Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP, i.e. a German business 
law journal) 2009, page 197, 199. 
14  See inter alia: http://www.wiwo.de/unternehmen-maerkte/risiken-deutscher-
banken-bei-816-milliarden-euro-395230/. 
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Recently, in October 2009, the US bank Merril Lynch has pre-
sented a research on the risks due to toxic securities held by 
German banks15. This research evaluates the amount of such 
risks up to 650 billion Euros and so confirms, in a way, the alarm-
ing result of the mentioned BaFin-dossier. 
II. Economic Background 
1. Subject Matter of the Mentioned Toxic Asset-Backed-
Securities 
In its core, American subprime mortgages are concerned. The real 
value of such papers is totally vague and their face amount was 
questionable from the beginning: 
Firstly, due to dubious estimations on the annual appreciation of 
US homes up to 25%. This expectation alone should have made 
every serious economist suspicious. 
Secondly, the financial crisis was based inter alia on a grotesque 
false estimation concerning the constant value of typical 
US homes: In principle, American homes have a very poor con-
struction; they are wooden houses without basement, without any 
sufficient thermal insulation. Such simple houses rot very fast, if 
the owner does not care constantly and efficiently for his home. 
Unfortunately, in the USA this necessary care is neglected in too 
many cases. 
Thirdly, contrary to the legal situation in Germany, the US home 
buyer, in principle, is not personally liable for the loan granted by 
the bank: If he is unable to repay the loan, he may deliver his 
home’s front door keys to the bank resulting in getting rid of all fi-
nancial liabilities16. 
                                      
15  See: http://www.handelsblatt.com/finanzen/aktienanalysen/merrill-lynch-
studie-milliarden-wertberichtigungsbedarf-bei-deutschen-banken;2470428. 
16  Marcus Lutter, (see footnote 13) page 198. 
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This lack of personal liability reduces the mortgages’ real value 
significantly since it might be very difficult or even impossible for 
German banks to enforce US mortgages being certified in deriva-
tives17. 
So, a German bank as holder of asset-backed securities based on 
US mortgages, in the end, only has as securing asset the respec-
tive real estate’s market value which, as was to be expected, has 
collapsed in the meantime due to the aforesaid aspects. Thus, in-
vesting billions of Euros of a bank’s money in such US asset-
backed securities by managers factually equals gambling away 
money on a huge scale. 
2. Some Reasons for such Speculative Investments 
Those highly-speculative investments were trendy among bankers 
during the last years. The offenders were blinded by short-term 
high profits resulting in high bonus payments for investment 
bankers; this may be labeled as excessive greed without any con-
sideration of the long-term financial interests of the bank con-
cerned. 
Part Three: Criminal Responsibility under German Law 
I.  Focusing on “Breach of Trust” as Criminal Offence 
against Property 
Below, criminal offences like “delay in filing for insolvency” and 
fraud by selling toxic securities in bad faith shall be excluded. 
Rather, subject matter is criminal breach of trust (“Untreue”) un-
der Sec. 266 German Criminal Code. This provision reads: 
                                      
17  In the meantime, an increasing number of US-Courts have required the original 
mortgage certificates as basis for enforcing measures. See inter alia: Deutsche 
Bank Nat’l Trust Co. v. Steele, 2008 WL 111227 (S.D. Ohio). 
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Whoever abuses his authorization, being granted by law, official 
mandate or private legal act, to dispose of third parties’ property or 
to obligate a third party, or breaches duties, being imposed upon 
him by law, official mandate, private legal act or fiduciary relation-
ship, to safeguard third parties' pecuniary interests, and thereby 
causes financial loss to the third party whose pecuniary interests 
he is responsible for, will be punished by imprisonment of up to 
five years or by fine.18 
II. Legal Interpretation of the Misdemeanor “Breach of Trust” 
1. The first modality of “breach of trust” – abusing his authorization 
by the perpetrator, e.g. a banker – is characterized by a legally 
effective disposition of third parties' property or a legally effective 
obligation of third parties, both via breach of restrictions inter 
partes imposed by law and/or contract in favour of the respective 
victim, e.g. the aggrieved bank19. 
Case example: M, CEO of a German bank, grants a high risk loan 
amounting to three million Euros. Its repayment is highly doubtful 
due to the credit user's serious financial problems; additionally 
there are no adequate securities. 
Case scenario one: M acted in bad faith since he was informed of 
the financial risk. 
Case scenario two: M acted without any sufficient knowledge of 
the financial risk. 
In both scenarios, the loan approval is legally effective since the 
CEO has the legal power to obligate the bank. However, there is a 
breach of his fiduciary duties towards the bank (restrictions inter 
partes). Such restrictions result from the German Stock Corpora-
tion Act. Its Sec. 93 subsection 1 (sentences 1 and 2) reads: 
                                      
18  Emphases added by the author. 
19  Thereto Krey/Hellmann, Strafrecht Besonderer Teil, Band 2, Vermögensdelikte, 
15th ed. 2008, sidenote 541, 545, with further references. 
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“Members of the board of managing directors have to perform their 
duties with the care that an ordinarily prudent person in a like posi-
tion would exercise under similar circumstances. No breach of du-
ties is given when the respective member making business deci-
sions could reasonably believe to be adequately informed and to 
act in the best interests of the corporation.”20 
By the way, the cited sentence 2 has been laid down in view of the  
US Business Judgement Rule21. 
As to the mentioned case example, in scenario one a breach of 
trust in the modality "abusing his authorization by the perpetrator" 
is self-evidently given, since there is no acting in the best interest 
of the corporation due to bad faith. However such cases are rare 
and, if they arise, the perpetrator's knowledge is hard to prove. 
More relevance in practice hold cases like scenario two. It clari-
fies the essential aspect of differentiation between legal business 
transactions with adequate risks on the one hand and illegal haz-
ardous business transactions on the other hand. The decisive 
question is whether or not the manager's business decision was 
based on adequate information. The additional rule applying to 
cases of granting large loans under Sec. 18 of the German Bank-
ing Act is dominated by this aspect as well: In principle, banks are 
only allowed to grant large credits when the debtor discloses his 
financial circumstances. 
So, in its core the Business Judgement Rule laid down in the 
German Stock Corporation Act only assures non-liability under 
civil law and exclusion from criminal responsibility, when managing 
directors make business decisions based on adequate informa-
tion. This legal element requires both, a thorough search for in-
formation and its sufficient control. Where such duties are ne-
glected, business transactions are like gambling away the bank’s 
money. 
                                      
20  Emphasis added by the author. 
21  Bosch/Lange, Juristenzeitung (JZ, i.e. a German law journal) 2009, 225, 229; 
Hopt/Roth in: Großkommentar zum Aktiengesetz (GK-AktG, i.e. a commentary 
on the German Stock Corporation Act), 4th ed. since 1999, § 93 sidenote 25. 
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2. Beside the required abuse of authorization, the perpetrator's 
special status as bearer of fiduciary duties (i.e. a specific obliga-
tion to take care of third parties' pecuniary interests, in German: 
Vermögensbetreuungspflicht) is an additional legal element of 
breach of trust22. Concerning managing directors making busi-
ness decisions, this element is not in dispute. 
3. Finally, breach of trust requires the victim’s detriment, more 
precisely: economic loss. Up to now, German jurisdiction and legal 
scholars insofar deemed sufficient cases where only a mere con-
crete endangerment of pecuniary interests was given. Whether or 
not this extension of the objective legal elements (actus reus) is 
convincing23 may be set aside, since in case of granting bad loans 
as well as in case of speculating with toxic derivatives, a real eco-
nomic loss of the aggrieved bank is given due to the following rea-
sons: 
Pursuant to the latest decisions of the German Federal Supreme 
Court of Justice, in such cases the real financial loss results from 
a view with respect to the balance sheet24. As to bad loans with 
high repayment risk respectively to toxic asset-backed securities 
based on American subprime mortgages, an allowance for depre-
ciation (downgrading, in German commercial law: Wertberichti-
gung) on the assets side is legally demanded. From a factual and 
a legal view, there is a real loss, based on the difference between 
the face amount of such credit claims respectively derivatives on 
the one hand and the depreciated amount on the other hand. 
                                      
22  The insight that the mentioned first modality of breach of trust (see above, Part 
Three, II, 1) requires such Vermögensbetreuungspflicht as well is prevailing 
legal opinion in case law and among legal scholars. See with further references: 
Krey/Hellmann (footnote 19) sidenote 541-543. 
23  Affirmative in principle: Bundesverfassungsgericht (BVerfG, i.e. the German 
Federal Constitutional Court), Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht (NStZ, i.e. a Ger-
man law journal) 2009, 560; answering in the negative inter alia: BGH St 
(Bundesgerichtshof, BGH, i.e. Federal Supreme Court of Justice, official re-
ports of criminal cases), Volume 53, p. 199, 203, 204, sidenote 15, 16. 
24  As to the following see: BGH St (see footnote 23), Volume 53, p. 199, 202, 
203, sidenote 13; BGH dated 13.08.2009 – 3 StR 576/08 –, sidenote 25. 
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4. Concerning the required intent as mental legal element (mens 
rea), in Germany the so-called dolus eventualis is sufficient25. Un-
der the common definition of intent as acting with knowledge and 
willfulness26, dolus eventualis is given, when the perpetrator seri-
ously takes into account that his act could fulfill the legal elements 
of the offense and accepts this fact27. Such accepting has to be 
assumed where the perpetrator either does not care about fulfilling 
those legal elements or wants to act at all costs28. So, dolus even-
tualis is something in between the Anglo-American recklessness 
and intent29. However, it has to be conceded that the component 
of willfulness of dolus eventualis generally may be assumed where 
the component of knowledge is given30. 
III. Speculative Purchase of Toxic Derivatives as Breach of 
Trust 
Firstly, the subsumption of such cases under the legal element 
abusing the perpetrator's authorization is self-evident as the 
banker acted without adequate information. Any German bank 
manager, purchasing those derivatives on a large scale, could not 
rely on sufficient information since even US-rating agencies were 
unable to evaluate the risk of asset-backed securities based on 
American subprime mortgages: Rating of mortgages regarding 
private homes was not part of their typical field of business activi-
ties and therefore not part of their know-how31 – not to mention 
                                      
25  Thereto in detail: Krey, Deutsches Strafrecht Allgemeiner Teil, Lehrbuch in 
Deutsch und Englisch, Teil II – German Criminal Law General Part, Textbook 
in German and English, Volume II, 2003, sidenotes 331, 336, 337, 346-364. 
26  Krey (see footnote 25), sidenote 336, 358 with further references. 
27  Thereto in detail Krey (see footnote 25), sidenote 346 et seq., 349, 353, 358 et 
seq. 
28  References in Krey (see footnote 25), sidenote 364. 
29  See thorougly and in detail: Wever, Fahrlässigkeit und Vertrauen im Rahmen 
der arbeitsteiligen Medizin. Vergleichende Betrachtungen zum materiellen 
Strafrecht ... in Deutschland und im anglo-amerikanischen Rechtskreis, p. 121-
139 with references on Anglo-American law. 
30  Krey (see footnote 25), sidenote 359. 
31  Marcus Lutter (see footnote 13), page 198. 
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the question of the rating agencies’ reliability due to their high de-
pendency on banks. 
Secondly, the mentioned perpetrator’s special status as bearer of 
fiduciary duties (Vermögensbetreuungspflicht)32 is also given. 
Thirdly, the required economic loss of the aggrieved bank results 
from the aforesaid necessity to carry out a depreciation (down-
grading) on the assets side in case of toxic asset-backed securi-
ties33; by all means, this holds if an allowance for depreciation to a 
significant extent is in question. 
Fourthly, at least in cases of purchasing toxic securities up to 
such amounts causing the danger of financial distress, the re-
quired intent is typically fulfilled. At the latest since early 2008, 
when purchasing the respective securities, knowledge and willful-
ness as to their toxic nature should be provable: 
On the one hand, the deciding bank managers knew, respectively 
took into account, that the purchase of those securities was not 
based on adequate information. Accordingly, many offenders’ 
typical excuse for these risky transactions is: “We did not know 
what we were buying“. This is no good excuse, since, by its very 
nature, it implies the perpetrator’s intent. 
Other offenders argue: “We blindly trusted in the rating agencies.” 
As mentioned, referring to rating agencies alone cannot compen-
sate the banker’s disregard of independent and thorough search 
for information. Yet, this aspect is largely neglected by German 
prosecution authorities: 
Pursuant to the author’s information, the public prosecution typi-
cally accepts the bank managers’ trust in the rating agencies’ es-
timation and therefore negates the perpetrator’s criminal intent34. 
However, this is no adequate solution due to the above mentioned 
reasons (the rating agencies’ lack of know-how about rating the 
                                      
32  See above, Part Three, II, 2. 
33  See above, Part Three, II, 3 in connection with footnote 24. 
34  See already above, Part Two, II, at the end. 
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respective US-mortgages35, furthermore such agencies’ dubious 
reliability because of their high dependency on banks36). 
On the other hand, the intent’s element of willfulness is given as 
well. The perpetrator’s acceptance that the aggrieved bank may 
suffer high loss is to be assumed, when he either did not care 
about such result or was speculating at any cost, in both sce-
narios aiming for short-term high profits as reason for high bonus 
payments. In principle, this attitude should be provable. 
IV. Closing words 
There should be criminal proceedings against bank managers for 
purchase of the toxic derivatives in question causing high loss37. 
Yet, such proceedings should not result in long lasting imprison-
ment. Rather, prison on probation38 or a high criminal fine, if ade-
quate up to millions of Euros, may be sufficient. Even terminating 
the proceedings after the defendant has paid a high sum of money 
to the treasury39 may be adequate in some cases. Solely decisive 
for reinforcing the people’s confidence in the law is the enforce-
ment of criminal proceedings, whereas draconian sentencing 
could be detrimental to the national economy. 
Refraining from criminal prosecution even in serious cases of pur-
chasing obscure asset-backed securities based on American sub-
                                      
35  Part Three, III, Firstly. 
36  See footnote 35, additionally Lüderssen, Strafverteidiger (StV, i.e. a German 
law journal) 2009, p. 486, 492. 
37  Dissenting Lüderssen (see footnote 36) inter alia p. 487 and 494. In his opinion 
both, the legal and economic aspects were absolutely not clarified and therefore 
the criminal courts had to contain themselves. However, this standpoint is not 
convincing as demonstrated above; in addition, it has to be emphasized that in 
Germany every transaction by banks has to be documented in records. 
38  In connection with the obligation (Auflage) to pay a certain sum of money to 
the treasury; see § 56 b subs. 2 no 2 German Criminal Code (Strafgesetzbuch, 
StGB). 
39  § 153 a German Criminal Procedure Code (Strafprozessordnung, StPO), thereto 
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prime mortgages, however, would send a dangerous signal to-
wards the investment banking industry. 
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The article deals with the responsibility of the financial sector under criminal law
inGermany. This question has been of special interest since the beginning of the
financial crisis.
The author argues that the transactions of asset-backed securities based on
American subprime mortgages fulfill all legal elements of the criminal offence
"breach of trust" ( ). From the author's point of view, the people's legal
loyalty would be severely affected if there were no criminal proceedings against
such bankers who purchased those toxic asset-backed securities without
sufficient information on their structure and value. Refraining from criminal
prosecution even in cases causing high loss would send a dangerous signal
towards the investment banking industry.
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